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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In their quest for regional security, rising powers China and India are 
seeking a powerful deterrent — nuclear weapons on submarines. In 
theory, this could reduce the risk of a major war in Indo-Pacific Asia, as 
no adversary would want to strike first against a country with so 
invulnerable a nuclear arsenal. Ballistic missile submarines are widely 
considered to have helped keep the peace during the Cold War, and 
continue to be the mainstay of US, Russian, French and British defence.  
But stability in the new Indo-Pacific nuclear balance remains many years 
away, and will be precarious even if attained. There will likely be a long 
phase of initial instability as China and India start deploying nuclear 
missiles on submarines without the full command and communications 
systems, and the training and doctrine so vital to a secure and credible 
deterrent. Even after such infrastructure is in place, Chinese and Indian 
nuclear-armed submarines — along with possible Pakistani and North 
Korean units — may remain detectable by adversaries, making their 
activities unpredictable in times of crisis. Moreover, these supposedly 
stabilising new forces may worsen wider maritime tensions, as China 
and India seek to dominate local waters in an effort to turn them into 
‘bastions’ for their nuclear-armed submarines.  
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The risks and uncertainties of strategic change in Indo-Pacific Asia are 
not limited to shifting relativities of conventional military power, diplomatic 
influence or economic weight. Nuclear weapons, those ultimate 
instruments of power from the 20th century, are also factors in today’s 
Indo-Pacific strategic competition.1 The regional contests for influence 
between the United States and China, and China and India, do not yet 
have the existential or ideological ‘life-or-death’ character of the Cold 
War. But quite literally below the surface, a new and dangerous 
competition is emerging as China and India in particular start deploying 
nuclear weapons at sea. 
Over the next decade, a number of sea-based nuclear weapon platforms 
in the Indo-Pacific will move from a testing and design phase, to active 
deployment. China has reportedly achieved the ability to conduct nuclear 
deterrent patrols — putting a nuclear-capable submarine to sea with the 
weapons on board — and India has launched its first nuclear ballistic 
missile submarine. Pakistan and North Korea are also pursuing a more 
rudimentary capability, which would involve diesel electric submarines 
carrying nuclear weapons. 
Advocates of sea-based nuclear weapons see such fleets as providing 
stability because of their relative invulnerability to surprise attack. 
Ballistic missile-carrying nuclear submarines (SSBNs), in particular, are 
seen to provide a secure ‘second-strike’ capability, ensuring that nuclear 
deterrence is credible and thus helps prevent war. This was certainly the 
case during the Cold War. But what applied in the 20th century struggle 
between the West and the Soviet Union does not necessarily hold for the 
more complex strategic situation that is now evolving in Asia.  
Indeed, even if sea-based nuclear weapons ultimately contribute to 
strategic stability in Asia, getting to such a situation will be far from 
straightforward. Whether the deployment of sea-based nuclear weapons 
brings stability or instability, will not be determined by these weapons 
alone. The interplay between the introduction of these weapons and 
existing regional tensions, notably over the South China Sea and the 
Bay of Bengal, will matter. The development of other capabilities like 
ballistic missile defence (BMD) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) will 
also alter calculations. As India and China move ahead with their SSBN 
programs, issues such as command and control, nuclear doctrine, 
deterrence signalling and force posture will have to be addressed in 
order to maximise the chances that these platforms contribute to stability 
rather than promote instability. The possibility of Pakistan or North Korea 
also putting nuclear-armed vessels to sea adds a new and unpredictable 
dimension to regional security.  
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This Report outlines some of the key risks and consequences 
associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons at sea in the Indo-
Pacific. It also considers what measures might be taken to help build a 
more stable deterrence structure in the region. These questions are 
addressed as part of a wider research and dialogue project, supported 
by the MacArthur Foundation. The Report draws on a workshop held in 
May 2014 that involved experts and former senior naval and military 
officers from China, India, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France and Australia, as well as an online debate on the Lowy Institute’s 
digital magazine, The Interpreter.2 It focuses principally on the 
challenges and consequences arising from SSBN capabilities being 
developed by China and India, as these two major powers are 
considerably advanced in their pursuit of sea-based nuclear weapons. 
The maritime nuclear weapon ambitions of others, notably Pakistan and 
perhaps eventually North Korea, are cause for concern but more matters 
of speculation at this stage, so this Report does not examine or consider 
them in depth.3 Meanwhile, the existence of powerful US and Russian 
SSBN capabilities has long been a given in the global strategic equation, 
and are thoroughly analysed elsewhere — although it is worth 
emphasising that both these powers are modernising their forces.4 
Nuclear deterrence does not exist in a vacuum. The deployment of 
nuclear weapons to sea by India and China will cause other powers in 
the region, including the United States and Japan, to change or bolster 
their conventional maritime capabilities. Thus the maritime nuclear 
programs of China and India are of particular regional and global 
importance, given that they may affect the nuclear and conventional 
strategic balance among major powers. 
STRATEGIC STABILITY 
The Indo-Pacific region is becoming the centre of gravity for global 
geopolitical competition and involves intersecting and sometimes 
clashing interests of no fewer than six nuclear-armed powers: the United 
States, China, Russia, India, Pakistan and North Korea. All are 
modernising their nuclear forces, and in the years and decades to come 
all may have nuclear-armed vessels operating under conditions of 
tension and mistrust in increasingly contested and congested waters.5 
As a result, strategic stability, a concept developed during the Cold War, 
is gaining new relevance in the Indo-Pacific. Strategic stability is 
essentially about reducing the incentives for states to launch nuclear 
weapons first while increasing their confidence that they will be able to 
launch those weapons in retaliation should it be necessary.6  
China and India, as the major regional powers in the Western Pacific 
and the Indian Ocean, respectively, are driving nuclear force 
modernisation across the region. Much of this is occurring on land, 
through long-range missiles. But, increasingly, modernisation is also 
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occurring through the development and deployment of sea-based 
nuclear weapons in ballistic missile submarines.  
A simple way to understand the complex challenges and consequences 
of the region’s new nuclear maritime geopolitics is in the form of a 
‘cascade effect’. The perceived asymmetries and responses in one 
nuclear deterrence relationship in the region have a cascading effect on 
others, both in terms of nuclear and conventional force postures. In 
particular, China is modernising its nuclear forces in response to the 
nuclear superiority of the United States. In turn, the United States is 
realigning its conventional maritime forces in the region in the face of 
China’s growing nuclear and conventional capabilities. This dynamic 
then has a cascading effect on India, which is further modernising its 
nuclear arsenal, both on land and at sea, to offset what it sees as 
China’s superior nuclear forces. Pakistan, meanwhile, is seeking nuclear 
capabilities to surmount both India’s nuclear forces and larger 
conventional military.7 The security partnership between China and 
Pakistan intensifies India’s determination to develop forces to counter 
them both.  
In the nuclear and conventional maritime domain, this cascading effect is 
already apparent in the Indo-Pacific. On top of the technical and 
operational challenges that sea-based nuclear weapons bring to the 
regional order, they will have significant consequences for the way India, 
China and the United States invest in and deploy their conventional 
maritime forces in the region. In this way, US nuclear superiority over 
China does not matter as much as the way that US forces respond in the 
region to China’s new nuclear maritime capabilities. This dynamic brings 
its own set of dangers and will need to be addressed if sea-based 
nuclear weapons are to contribute to strategic stability in the Indo-
Pacific. 
During the Cold War, the introduction of SSBNs was generally 
considered to have reduced the risk of nuclear war between the United 
States and the USSR. The Indo-Pacific does not possess the same 
existential or ideological confrontation of the Cold War, putting less day-
to-day strain on the deterrence relationships in the region. But the 
possibility of security crises in the 21st century Indo-Pacific can hardly be 
dismissed. So it is worth considering whether lessons can be taken from 
the Cold War experience. 
Initially, during the Cold War, technological limitations forced early 
SSBNs to patrol dangerously close to enemy coastlines.8 As one US 
admiral put it, the “vulnerability [of SSBNs was] … that of a ‘tethered 
goat’.”9 However, once submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) 
were developed with longer ranges, the relative invulnerability of SSBNs 
was increased. The first example of this was when US submarines 
acquired the Trident I missile in the late 1970s, which increased their 
patrol areas to tens of millions of square nautical miles.10 Once the 
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USSR developed long-range SLBMs, they began to employ them under 
the polar ice or in heavily defended waters near their home ports: so-
called ‘bastions’ where they were better protected from detection or 
attack. 
A major milestone in the use of SSBNs was the concept and practice of 
‘continuous at sea deterrence’ (CASD).11 This involved keeping a 
rotation of nuclear-armed submarines on patrol, undetected and 
prepared for conflict, at all times — and signalling to potential 
adversaries that this was the case. In the words of a senior practitioner, 
former UK First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, this required 
credibility based on “a proven, assured capability underpinned by a clear 
declaratory policy.”12 He has described CASD as an underlying “feature 
of world order” which guards against the need for powerful countries to 
suddenly surge their nuclear readiness “at a time of growing crisis 
thereby aggravating and escalating an already tense diplomatic 
environment.”13  
One feature distinguishing the Cold War from the present is that the 
United States and USSR built their SSBNs in large numbers. In 
particular, this helped the Soviets compensate for their inferior, relatively 
detectable or noisy submarines, and helped ensure that if their SSBNs 
were attacked some would survive long enough to launch their 
weapons.14 So far in the Indo-Pacific regional powers are only seeking 
sea-based nuclear weapons and platforms in relatively small numbers.  
NEW CAPABILITIES, NEW CHALLENGES 
The lessons of the Cold War will inform the challenges China and India 
face as they introduce their new nuclear-armed submarine capabilities. 
Although both powers will strive to keep operational information about 
these assets deeply classified, a substantial amount of knowledge and 
informed speculation is available in the public domain, and can help an 
understanding of the risks and problems ahead. It is also worth briefly 
considering what future directions the other emerging nuclear powers in 
Asia such as Pakistan and North Korea might take with respect to 
putting nuclear weapons at sea. 
CHINA 
Although much of China’s nuclear force modernisation has focused on 
improving the range, accuracy and mobility of its land-based missiles, 
enough effort and resources have gone into advancing the submarine 
force to suggest that China is getting serious about SSBNs; not just to 
give Beijing additional certainty that it could threaten or inflict massive 
damage in the case of a nuclear conflict, but also to improve its chances 
of penetrating US missile defences in any such conflict. A future 
generation of Chinese submarines, operating undetected in the open 
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ocean, could challenge US missile defences by attacking from an 
unexpected launch azimuth from an unanticipated location.15  
China has now progressed well beyond its first experiment in SSBN 
technology: the sole and ageing Type 092 or Xia-class boat that was 
designed in the 1970s, commissioned in the 1980s, and finally unveiled 
to the world in a 2009 international fleet review. Although considered 
exceptionally noisy and detectable, the Type 092 is widely thought to 
serve China principally as a technology demonstrator: it is believed 
never to have conducted a patrol with nuclear weapons on board.16  
China is now concentrating on its successor, the Type 094 or Jin-class 
submarines, most of which are home ported at the Yulin Naval Base on 
Hainan Island in the South China Sea. The Pentagon considers this 
China’s first “credible sea-based nuclear deterrent” and assesses four of 
these boats to be operational, with a fifth under construction, all to be 
equipped with up to twelve JL-2 SLBM, estimated to have a range of 
7400 km — enough to reach US territory from the waters of the Western 
Pacific.17 Additionally, the Pentagon assesses that China is developing 
an improved third generation SSBN, the Type-096, to be fitted with a 
long-range missile, the JL-3, which could reach the United States from 
the waters of the South China Sea.18 
What is not clear is when Chinese SSBNs will commence deterrence 
patrols with nuclear weapons on board. The Pentagon has previously 
projected that this turning point would occur in late 2014, but has revised 
that prediction to sometime in 2015.19 More broadly, China is showing 
increased seriousness about its ability to conduct prolonged submarine 
operations. Recent long-range patrols by Chinese nuclear submarines, 
notably in the Indian Ocean in 2013 and 2014, are signs that the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is testing the operational 
procedures and endurance of its crew on long-range submerged 
voyages such as those conducted by SSBNs.20 Indeed, one US Navy 
Vice Admiral has said on the record that a Chinese SSBN has already 
conducted a 95-day patrol.21  
China still has a way to go before it can boast a relatively invulnerable 
nuclear deterrent at sea: the Type 094 SSBN has been rated by the US 
Office of Naval Intelligence to be relatively noisy, and easier to detect 
than Russian SSBNs from the late 1970s.22 This would make the 
Type 094 vulnerable to detection and tracking, even more so given that 
the range of the JL-2 missile would require the boats to operate in the 
open ocean of the Pacific.23 Still, in a future possible confrontation with 
India, the Type 094 would have the range to strike India from Chinese 
coastal waters.  
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INDIA 
India’s nuclear forces are in the midst of extensive modernisation. 
Despite confident rhetoric about the quality of India’s deterrent, it 
remains uncertain whether India has a reliable second-strike capability 
against its two potential adversaries, China and Pakistan. It is widely 
assumed that India’s land-based missiles, often with shorter ranges, are 
intended to deter a nuclear-armed Pakistan, whereas the submarine 
program is aimed at giving India confidence that it will not be coerced by 
China. Some of India’s land-based weapons, notably long-range variants 
of the Agni missile, are also believed to be designed to target China, but 
submarines will increase India’s confidence that it could retaliate if struck 
first. 
Test flights of Indian ballistic missiles are becoming commonplace. It is 
possible that in 2015 India will conduct the first test-firing of a ballistic 
missile — the B-05 or K-15 — from a submerged Indian submarine.24 
This would be the next step in advancing India’s long-held ambition to 
achieve a ‘triad’ of land-, air- and sea-launched nuclear weapons. A 
previous milestone in this program was the launch in 2009 of New 
Delhi’s first SSBN, the INS Arihant.25 A second such submarine is being 
built — potentially to be put to sea within the next year or two — and a 
third and possibly fourth are also planned.26 There are reports that in the 
medium term, an updated design is planned for India’s fifth SSBN, which 
will be larger and contain a more powerful reactor, allowing longer-range 
patrols.27  
There are conflicting accounts of whether India intends the Arihant to be 
merely a technology demonstrator or an operational weapons-carrying 
platform. In 2010 Indian media reported the then Indian Naval Chief as 
suggesting that K-15 ballistic missiles would be paired with the vessel 
from about 2016.28 However, there has been some speculation that 
since the vessel is partly based on the old Akula-class Soviet SSN, and 
because it is India’s first indigenously designed nuclear submarine, its 
acoustic signature is not likely to be quieter than China’s Jin-class boats. 
In other words, both India and China will initially have nuclear-armed 
submarines that are relatively easy for potential adversaries to track.29  
The shortcomings of the K-15 SLBM are a major limitation on India’s 
sea-based nuclear deterrent. The range of the K-15 is believed to be just 
750 km, meaning that Indian vessels would have to patrol dangerously 
close to the Chinese or Pakistani coasts.30 In terms of India’s deterrent 
against China, a vessel equipped with the K-15 would have to transit 
busy choke points such as the Straits of Malacca or Sunda and loiter off 
the Chinese coastline, thereby running a high risk of being detected by 
China’s fast-improving surveillance and anti-access forces and being 
pre-emptively attacked in a crisis. The nature of the Soviet-designed 
nuclear reactor on board, with a short refuelling cycle, could also limit the 
length and frequency of patrols.31  
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New Delhi is trying to address these shortcomings by developing 
submarine-launched missiles with longer ranges: the K-4 (3000 km 
range) underwent an undersea test launch (from a pontoon not a 
submarine) in early 2015 and the K-5 (5000 km range) is reportedly in 
the design phase.32 It is unclear whether these larger missiles would fit 
into the Arihant class, or whether they will only be compatible with an 
updated Indian SSBN design. It is possible that Indian submarines will 
end up carrying up to twelve K-15 missiles each, or a smaller number, 
perhaps four, of the long-range missiles. 
OTHER POTENTIAL NUCLEAR PLAYERS – PAKISTAN 
Pakistan has made strides towards establishing a sea-based second-
strike capability over the last decade, but is significantly behind both 
China and India. Pakistan’s program also seems to be based on short-
range cruise missiles and diesel electric submarines, rather than SSBNs. 
It is clear that as India has developed its own sea-based deterrence 
capabilities, Islamabad has sought to “equalize its strategic relationship 
with its neighbour.”33 An authoritative account concludes that Islamabad 
is seeking a sea-based deterrent because of a combination of its 
perceived growing conventional military imbalance with India, a lack of 
strategic depth and a reliance on nuclear coercion.34 India’s continuing 
development of ballistic missile defence systems is also likely to be 
playing a role. The argument made by some analysts that Pakistan 
intends to base the nuclear-capable Babur cruise missile on submarines 
was bolstered earlier this year when Islamabad announced its intention 
to purchase eight Chinese-made diesel-electric submarines, most likely 
the Yuan-class.35 If true, this would reinforce Indian concerns that China 
is deliberately helping Pakistan pose a nuclear threat to India. 
NORTH KOREA 
North Korea has reportedly made some progress on both fitting a 
submarine with vertical launch tubes and testing a missile, which 
appears to place Pyongyang in the initial developmental stages of a sea-
based deterrent. Independent analysts, as well as officials from the 
United States and South Korea, have reported on North Korea’s 
advances in both submarine technology, as well as warhead 
miniaturisation and submersible missiles. In May 2015 North Korean 
state media publicised the apparently successful ‘breaching’ test of a 
submerged ballistic missile.36 However, there is reason for a high 
degree of caution about these claims. Some reports suggest that North 
Korea faked the pictures of its missile test.37 And it is far from clear 
whether North Korea has made the advances in guidance and targeting 
capabilities that are critical for at-sea ballistic missile operations. There is 
also evidence that the missile in question, a design based on the Soviet 
R-27 SLBM that was in service from 1968 to 1988, is liquid-fuelled, 
raising questions about its reliability.38 While North Korea has invested 
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significantly in submarines, these have tended to be small, diesel boats 
based on old designs. Pyongyang is likely to be decades away from a 
reliable sea-based nuclear deterrent, but will no doubt continue to 
generate fear and uncertainty about its program. 
A LOOMING ERA OF INSTABILITY 
It is fair to assume that within the next decade, China and India will begin 
deterrent patrols at sea. Eventually, seaborne nuclear weapons might 
contribute to strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific in somewhat the same 
way they did so during the Cold War. But it will take time and much 
development of the technology and doctrine associated with these 
weapons to reach that point.  
In the meantime, the proliferation of sea-launched nuclear weapons in 
the Indo-Pacific has the potential to aggravate instability among the 
region’s nuclear powers. This will be a phase of heightened risk, 
worsened because of the interplay between the introduction of these 
weapons and existing maritime tensions. As the technical and 
operational experiences of the Cold War powers testifies, simply having 
and deploying nuclear-armed platforms at sea will not contribute to 
overall strategic stability. Communication systems, intelligence, 
command and control, crew training, clear doctrine and channels of 
diplomatic signalling during times of tension will all be needed to 
maximise stability. Until these systems are in place SSBNs could be a 
strategic liability, rather than a stabilising presence, particularly during 
conflict or crisis situations.39 
There are five key areas of risk associated with the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pacific region at this stage.  
1. CHANGES TO EXISTING NUCLEAR POSTURE 
Since their development, both India and China’s land-based and 
airborne nuclear weapons have been kept in various states of 
disassembly. Particularly in India’s case, multiple government agencies 
control separate elements of their land-based missile systems and 
associated warheads. However, nuclear deterrence patrols on an SSBN 
require the warheads, missiles and charges to be completely mated, 
ready to fire, in the submarine’s launch tubes. This will elevate the 
nuclear strategic readiness of both nations and alter their nuclear force 
postures. A similar change occurred during the Cold War. Initially, in the 
Soviet Union, nuclear warheads were kept under KGB control and 
separate from delivery vehicles. This changed in the late 1960s when 
the USSR began deterrence patrols with SSBNs.40 The consequence 
was a heightened Soviet nuclear force posture.41 
There are signs that these changes may already be occurring in Indian 
and Chinese strategic forces. Currently, civilian agencies are reported to 
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be in control of India’s nuclear warheads and they are only handed over 
to the military “in the final stages of an ordered nuclear strike.”42 With a 
commissioned SSBN force, however, the navy would gain full 
‘operational control’ of Indian nuclear weapons, perhaps opening the 
way to direct military control of other armaments in the nuclear triad.43 In 
the case of China, the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps have traditionally 
been the keepers of the country’s nuclear arsenal.44 Chinese SSBNs on 
active deterrence patrol will require the PLAN to exercise a certain 
amount of control over the country’s nuclear weapons, a significant 
organisational change in the way China’s nuclear weapons are handled. 
The technological and engineering necessity of having fully mated 
nuclear ballistic missiles on Chinese and Indian submarines also raises 
important questions for crisis stability in the Indo-Pacific: will future crises 
have a higher degree of instability due to fully mated nuclear weapons 
being present in the region? 
2. UNDERDEVELOPED COMMAND AND CONTROL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Credible SSBN forces place huge demands on command structures. 
Survivable communications between SSBNs at sea and national 
command authorities are critical to their ability to provide a credible 
deterrent.45 During the Cold War, both superpowers put large resources 
into ensuring that communication with their SSBNs were reliable and 
secure.46 Communication with submarines is complicated by the 
physical limitations of transmitting signals through water.47 Most 
countries that operate SSBNs currently do so primarily through very low 
frequency (VLF) communication, which requires large vertical transmitter 
stations. Extremely low frequency (ELF) systems can also be used to 
reach submarines patrolling in deep waters, directing them to rise to VLF 
depth for further instructions. 
Despite indications that China and India have been investing in the 
technology and infrastructure necessary to communicate with their 
SSBNs, there is little evidence that they have built survivable or reliable 
systems. Information on China’s VLF capability is sparse, but there are 
reports that China achieved a level of capability in the early 1980s, and 
that it has constructed several VLF transmission stations along the 
Chinese coastline.48 There is evidence in Chinese technical journals of 
continuing research into VLF and ELF technology.49 New Delhi has 
stepped up its submarine communication capability in the last several 
years,50 establishing a new VLF facility, INS Kattabomman, in the 
country’s south.51 However, neither China nor India seems to have 
created the type of airborne systems for communicating with submarines 
that are seen by observers as necessary for undertaking credible 
deterrence patrols.52  
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New Chinese and Indian SSBNs will need to operate under command 
and control procedures that are new to the Chinese and Indian navies. 
Their crews will not have much experience of long-range and extended 
patrols without direct and constant communication with national 
command authorities. As these countries learn to operate their new 
SSBNs there will be risks of miscommunication and even of inadvertent 
escalation. 
3. INCIDENTS AT SEA 
The development of Chinese and Indian SSBN forces will also compel 
others to respond, shaking up conventional force postures in the Indo-
Pacific in ways that may inadvertently heighten regional tensions. The 
emergence of sea-based nuclear weapons and the proliferation of 
conventional submarines in the Indo-Pacific is already changing the way 
the United States, China, India, Japan and others are investing in 
conventional maritime forces, as well as where and how they are being 
deployed. In particular, the United States, China, India, Japan and other 
powers are investing anew in anti-submarine warfare.  
The most effective tool in anti-submarine warfare is another submarine. 
Already the region is seeing a proliferation in conventional submarines 
for a variety of reasons, including the advantages that submarines bring 
in intelligence gathering, land attack, and the interdiction of shipping.53 
As the Chinese and Indian SSBN programs advance, and as Pakistan 
and North Korea consider their own more rudimentary seaborne nuclear 
plans, the proliferation of conventional submarines is likely to accelerate. 
As more countries deploy submarines and other conventional forces 
capable of tracking SSBNs in the region, the greater the potential for 
unplanned encounters and incidents between these forces. 
These risks are particularly acute in the subsurface domain. Collisions 
and near misses occurred many times in the Cold War, particularly 
during the early phases of Soviet SSBN deployments, when on at least 
three occasions in 1970 alone US submarines collided with the Soviets 
they were trailing.54 Unofficial sources place the number of such 
collisions between SSBNs and their tailing submarines as high as 20 to 
40.55 Dangerous submarine incidents can occur even among allies in 
the post-Cold War world, as shown by a potentially disastrous crash 
between British and French nuclear-armed boats in 2009.56 With the 
number of submarines operating in the Indo-Pacific growing, particularly 
around choke points, the chances of such encounters will increase.57 As 
the commander of US submarines in the Pacific, Rear Admiral Phillip 
Sawyer has noted, “the more submarines you put in the same body of 
water, the higher the probability that they might collide.”58 
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4. CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACES AND MARITIME TENSIONS 
There are already some signs that the development of SSBNs is 
contributing to maritime tensions and this may accelerate in the future. 
One thesis for China’s growing assertiveness and construction activity in 
the South China Sea is that they are preparing to use this territory as a 
bastion for their SSBN fleet. Former Japanese Admirals are among the 
strongest proponents of the view that China’s ‘covert purpose’ in trying to 
eject US surveillance from the South China Sea is to be able to deploy 
SSBNs undetected into the Pacific in order to hold US cities at risk 
during a crisis.59 One advantage China could draw from its recent 
building of islands in the South China Sea is that these could help 
expand the infrastructure of its submarine detection or Sound 
Surveillance System (SOSUS) network of hydrophone arrays. There is 
evidence that China has built SOSUS networks around some of its major 
naval bases, such as those around Hainan Island, which would suggest 
that the PLAN is working towards a more comprehensive surveillance 
and ASW capability.60 The extension of this system and capability to 
islands in the South China Sea would give the PLAN the ability to 
conduct passive acoustic monitoring of large swathes of the region. This, 
along with any further militarisation of the islands themselves, such as 
the installation of radar and anti-air infrastructure, would allow Beijing to 
establish a working ‘bastion’ for its SSBNs. China may also be seeking 
to disrupt the US and Japanese surveillance effort in the East and South 
China Seas, through deliberate encounters or challenges involving ships 
and aircraft as well as through the enforcement of a new Air Defence 
Identification Zone. 
One of the advantages in establishing the undersea ‘third leg’ of a 
nuclear triad is that it complicates the deterrence calculations of 
adversaries, compelling them to invest heavily in tracking and defending 
against SSBNs.61 For example, even a few operational Chinese SSBNs 
would “compel the U.S. to plan for a theoretical Chinese nuclear-missile 
strike from the sea.”62 This would affect how the United States deploys 
its fleet63 and plans for its defences against ballistic missiles. In time, this 
will likely hold true also for India and — against Indian SSBN forces — 
for China. This is an example of the ‘cascading’ effect that SSBNs will 
have on both the Indo-Pacific region’s nuclear posture and conventional 
force deployment. China’s coming SSBN deployment may even give 
more impetus for continued investment in BMD throughout the region. 
This raises the prospect that strategic anti-submarine warfare — finding, 
tracking, countering and if need be destroying SSBNs — will become a 
heightened priority for conventional maritime forces.64 It is even likely 
that naval nuclear tensions between India and China will arise from their 
efforts to protect their respective nuclear bastions in the Bay of Bengal 
and in the South China Sea.65 To be able to strike Chinese territory, 
Indian SSBNs — even with their eventual longer-range K-4 missiles — 
could well end up patrolling in the Bay of Bengal, under the watch of 
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Indian surface and coastal forces. China would face great difficultly in 
bringing its surface and air ASW forces to the Bay of Bengal to trail 
Indian SSBNs so close to India. However, China could still attempt to 
deploy nuclear attack submarines into the Indian Ocean to sow doubts in 
Indian minds about the survivability of their nuclear deterrent. This may 
be one of the purposes of China’s experimentation with such 
deployments in recent years.66 
Much of the risk inherent around the proliferation of nuclear weapons at 
sea in the Indo-Pacific will depend on whether the Chinese and Indian 
governments choose to deploy their undersea nuclear forces 
prematurely. Given the scale of investment going into these programs, 
and the intense national pride and prestige attached to such iconic great-
power weapons, naval commanders may be reluctant to underscore to 
their political masters the true limitations of their nascent SSBN assets. 
The limited ranges of Chinese and Indian sea-launched missiles could 
tempt their governments to risk deploying these assets into waters 
where their own surface and surveillance forces do not have significant 
control. Such premature deployment could be conducted during times of 
tension, as coercive or defensive signals or to bolster substantive 
deterrence. This would be particularly hazardous if such steps were 
taken before the human and technical infrastructure necessary for 
secure and credible SSBN operations was in place.  
5. THE POSSIBILITY OF RAPID ESCALATION 
The relatively underdeveloped state of Chinese SSBNs also poses a risk 
in the unlikely event of conventional conflict between China and the 
United States in the near future. Some aspects of both US and Chinese 
strategies for major conventional conflict might inadvertently raise the 
risks of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons.  
The Air-Sea Battle concept, now the Joint Concept for Access and 
Maneuver in the Global Commons, was designed to ensure access for 
US expeditionary forces to areas contested by China’s anti-access and 
area-denial capabilities.67 The concept calls for the integration of “air, 
maritime, land, space and cyberspace” domains in order to “disrupt, 
destroy and defeat” the enemy. However, the primary way that the 
concept seeks to accomplish this mission is through the disruption of 
“command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance” systems in a “blinding” campaign. The plan calls 
for strikes on “softer targets” as well as at “the web of networks and 
satellites” controlling the enemy’s communications and other 
weaponry.68  
Similar Chinese doctrines and strategies for conventional war could also 
be dangerously escalatory in the nuclear domain. For example, as laid 
out in the 2013 edition of The Science of Military Strategy, the PLA 
places significant weight on maintaining “strategic information 
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superiority” by conducting “soft damage or hard destruction through 
cyber attacks inflicted upon the infrastructure and fundamental 
information resources … which a country’s armed forces depend 
upon.”69 In a similar fashion to the concept of ASB, this information 
warfare is designed to disrupt the command and control of forces on the 
battlefield, and likely also includes submarines. 
What is not clear about either of these doctrines is whether there are any 
plans for discrimination between communication networks and satellites 
that are integral for communication with nuclear forces, particularly 
SSBNs at sea. The result of such a strategy might be ‘virtual 
decapitation’, whereby communication is broken between national 
command authorities and strategic forces through a combination of 
cyber and conventional attack.70 For instance, during a conflict the 
United States might be tempted to launch a ‘blinding’ campaign on 
Chinese communication networks involving strikes against VLF 
communication nodes in an attempt to cut communication between the 
PLAN military leadership and Chinese nuclear attack submarines, 
resulting in disrupted communications with deployed Chinese SSBNs as 
well. 
This theoretical loss of communication would put more pressure on the 
underdeveloped command and control arrangements of India and 
China’s SSBNs. Related to questions about reliable communications is 
the critical issue of who controls the nuclear weapons on board. 
Permissive action links (PAL), locking systems designed to prevent the 
unauthorised launch of nuclear weapons by physically separating 
nuclear launch codes from the weapons, would need to be installed on 
Indian and Chinese SSBNs.71 It is still unclear what progress India or 
China has made on these.72  
There is also the issue of direct attacks on SSBNs in any conventional 
conflict. The best-case scenario for a conventional conflict, particularly 
involving a country with a low number of vulnerable SSBNs, would be for 
the attacker to implement a discrimination strategy. This would call for 
the country with the ASW advantage to avoid destroying the other 
country’s SSBNs in an effort to maintain strategic stability and to prevent 
a ‘use it or lose it’ dynamic. This was a major criticism of the US maritime 
strategies in the later phases of the Cold War that involved US attack 
submarines surging into Soviet SSBN bastions.73 This is not just an 
issue for the United States and China. These same risks will exist when 
India and China commence their first deterrence patrols over the next 
several years. During any conventional conflict in the Indo-Pacific, 
SSBNs could be targeted and destroyed out of self-defence by attack 
submarines, raising the possibility of inadvertent escalation.  
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A LONG-TERM STABILISER? 
Not everything in geopolitics gets worse all the time. Assuming that 
lessons are learned and potential crises managed in the decade ahead, 
advances in Chinese and Indian SSBN and SLBM technology may 
eventually contribute to a new phase of relative strategic stability where 
the existence of nuclear weapons keeps the peace and prevents their 
use. Strategic stability also means minimising the risk that nuclear 
weapons will be used by accident or without authorisation.74 The 
achievement of strategic stability during the Cold War was, however, 
hardly a forgone conclusion. It required evolutions in technology, posture 
and doctrine, but also witnessed moments of near catastrophe, notably 
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, in which a Soviet submarine 
commander’s preparations to launch a nuclear torpedo could have been 
the opening shot in a global nuclear war.75 
A number of technological milestones will need to be achieved by India, 
China and other prospective nuclear players to reach this stage. In 
particular, Chinese and Indian nuclear-armed submarines will need to 
make substantial progress in quieting their engines and overall acoustic 
signatures — to ensure that they remain a credible, and hence 
stabilising, deterrent for both countries. Quiet submarines will strengthen 
the credibility of their second strike capability, allowing Indian and 
Chinese SSBNs to survive in their respective coastal waters, even in the 
unlikely event of a devastating first strike against their home ports. 
Similarly, longer-range SLBMs would allow China and India to establish 
credible and assured nuclear triads that would contribute to strategic 
stability rather than drive strategic uncertainty. The still-in-development 
K-4 SLBM will allow Indian SSBNs to provide a credible sea-based 
deterrent against China from the Bay of Bengal, without it having to 
transition through the Strait of Malacca or patrol near Chinese waters. 
Once China’s SSBNs become operational they will have a second-strike 
capability against India, although they will not have one against the 
continental United States. The JL-3, China’s next generation SLBM, will 
likely have the range to perform a second-strike role against the United 
States, but there are few reports on what progress China has made on 
the missile.76  
One complicating factor in the development of a stable deterrence 
structure is the growing number of BMD programs in the region. The 
United States (and Japan), as well as China and India, all have BMD 
programs in various stages of development, with the United States 
widely considered to be far ahead.77 Such programs can be an obstacle 
to achieving strategic stability by limiting the ability of a state to retaliate 
after suffering a first strike.78 This can be especially true if BMD is used 
in conjunction with ASW, where the patrolling of SSBNs can be 
contained to a specific geographic location thereby allowing missile 
defences to operate more effectively.79 For instance, if Chinese SSBNs 
are loud enough to be found, US or allied surface ships with anti-ballistic 
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missile capabilities could be forward deployed in order to detect and 
track SLBMs from launch and thus help ensure their interception, 
creating potential pressures on political leaders to either order an attack 
on the surface ships or have their SSBNs launch their missiles before 
they are found.80  
Another reason that the possible stability brought by SSBNs could prove 
short-lived is the potential for disruptive leaps in technology to detect 
submarines. Scientific advances in quantum computing and unmanned 
systems could make submarines easier to find, even if the prospect of 
absolute transparency of the oceans remains elusive. Alternatives to 
20th century sonar have existed in theory for some time — such as the 
ability to detect submarine movements through the movement of water 
that their wake produces — but the necessary computing power needed 
to run “oceanographic models in real time” has been out of reach.81 But 
with the continued enhancement and miniaturisation of computer 
processing, the capability to use new sensor methods to track submarine 
movements could eventually be available on board ships, aircraft, UUVs 
and deployable systems placed on the sea floor.82 Small, autonomous 
sensory vehicles could be spread out across choke points and littorals to 
detect submarines.83 Submarines would not become obsolete (not least 
because they themselves could carry the new technologies to detect 
other submarines) but would need to be deployed with greater caution, 
and assumptions about the invulnerability of SSBNs might need to be 
reviewed.84 
MINIMISING RISK 
There are number of steps that could be taken to help reduce the risks 
associated with the introduction of sea-based nuclear weapons in the 
Indo-Pacific while the technology and doctrine associated with these 
weapons matures. 
Exchanges with established nuclear powers: The United Kingdom and 
France operate SSBN fleets of a similar size and disposition to those 
that might eventually be built by China and India. Both operate a small 
number of SSBNs with highly professional crews and command systems 
in place. The nuclear readiness that France and the United Kingdom 
have achieved involves an exceptional standard of human and technical 
infrastructure that took decades to develop. China and India could learn 
from the experience of these countries. Russian involvement might be 
an important added confidence-building measure given that both the 
United Kingdom and France are seen as allies of the United States. Any 
dialogue would, however, need to be conducted in a way that is neither 
patronising towards the emerging powers nor seen as a ploy to limit the 
size of their nuclear fleets. The United States and its allies in the Indo-
Pacific would also be acutely sensitive to any dialogue or information 
sharing that, while aiding regional stability, might also improve China’s 
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nuclear capabilities. Even so, a regular meeting at the unofficial or 
second track level, involving former naval practitioners, defence planners 
and technical specialists, could eventually evolve into a carefully 
managed formal dialogue on the stable, responsible introduction of 
seaborne nuclear weapons into the region. 
Confidence-building measures: The whole character and advantage of 
submarines is their secrecy, so it would seem odd to recommend 
transparency and confidence-building measures around SSBN 
programs. However, there is an emerging recognition of the need for 
navies to at least begin testing the waters on this front, given the risks of 
unexpected encounters or even collisions in an increasingly crowded 
undersea security environment. Singapore has recently called for 
discussion on regional confidence-building measures for submarines in 
general.85 This initiative is worth wider support, including from countries 
such as Australia and Indonesia, bearing in mind that much of the 
trouble could occur in the regional waterways on which their security 
depends. It could be pursued through mechanisms that involve many 
regional powers including China and India. A logical structure would be 
the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, which parallels the East 
Asia Summit in including China, India, Japan, the United States, Russia, 
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the 10 Southeast Asia 
countries.  
China–India maritime security dialogue: As China and India increase 
their ocean-going naval capabilities and move to the operational 
deployment of nuclear-armed submarines, the time is ripe for them to 
begin a serious maritime security dialogue. A general maritime security 
dialogue between the two powers has been announced more than once 
in recent years, but has not yet convened. When it does eventually 
convene, it will be an opportunity for the two countries to discuss their 
nascent SSBN programs and to minimise risks and potential 
misunderstandings about the operation of their respective fleets. 
US–China strategic stability dialogue: Such a dialogue has been called 
for repeatedly at least since the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review 
obliquely acknowledged a degree of emerging mutual vulnerability to 
each other’s nuclear weapons. Sooner or later, both powers will need to 
pursue such dialogue in earnest. China’s SSBN program, as well as any 
US and allied efforts to counter it, will need to be part of the discussion. 
Some of these issues may need to be addressed initially through 
unofficial or second track dialogues. It will be important for both sides to 
send clear messages about nuclear doctrine, targeting, and the way the 
introduction of Chinese SSBNs could change US and Chinese naval 
operations. This could help ensure the stable management of future 
crises or incidents. 
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CONCLUSION  
Not merely drowned relics of the Cold War, sea-launched nuclear 
weapons are becoming a reality in the Indo-Pacific. This new reality is 
multipolar and complicated, with China and India striving to achieve 
second-strike capabilities, Pakistan and North Korea making gradual but 
slow steps towards putting nuclear weapons at sea, and other powers in 
the region such as the United States adjusting its own force posture in 
response. As these different powers progress down these paths, it is 
clear that the maritime spaces of the Indo-Pacific will have an added 
nuclear dimension that may interact with conventional military forces in 
unexpected and dangerous ways. A realistic goal is not to stop or 
reverse this trajectory, but rather to find ways to limit and manage it, and 
ensure that these fearsome armaments strengthen rather than 
undermine peace and stability in the region. 
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